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Abstract
The classical Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) models the assignment of junior doctors
to hospitals based on their preferences over one another. In an instance of this problem,
a stable matching M is sought which ensures that no blocking pair can exist in which a
resident r and hospital h can improve relative to M by becoming assigned to each other.
Such a situation is undesirable as it could naturally lead to r and h forming a private
arrangement outside of the matching.
The original HR model assumes that preference lists are strictly ordered. However
in practice, this may be an unreasonable assumption: an agent may find two or more
agents equally acceptable, giving rise to ties in its preference list. We thus obtain the
Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (HRT). In such an instance, stable matchings may
have different sizes and MAX HRT, the problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable
matching, is NP-hard.
In this paper we describe an Integer Programming (IP) model for MAX HRT. We
also provide some details on the implementation of the model. Finally we present results
obtained from an empirical evaluation of the IP model based on real-world and randomly
generated problem instances.
1 Introduction
The Hospital Residents Problem (HR) has applications in a number of centralised matching
schemes which seek to match graduating medical students (residents) to hospital positions.
Examples of such schemes include the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) [18] and
the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [17] in Scotland and the US respectively.
The challenges presented by these and other applications have motivated research in the area
of algorithms for matching problems.
Formally an instance I of HR involves a set R = {r1, r2, ..., rn1} of residents and H =
{h1, h2, ..., hn2} of hospitals. Each resident ri ∈ R ranks a subset of H in strict order of
preference with each hospital hj ∈ H ranking a subset of R, consisting of those residents who
ranked hj , in strict order of preference. Each hospital hj also has a capacity cj ∈ Z+ indicating
the maximum number of residents that can be assigned to it. A pair (ri, hj) is called an
acceptable pair if hj appears in ri’s preference list and ri on hj ’s preference list. A matching
M is a set of acceptable pairs such that each resident is assigned to at most one hospital and
the number of residents assigned to each hospital does not exceed its capacity. A resident ri
is unmatched in M if no acceptable pair in M contains ri. We denote the hospital assigned
to resident ri in M as M(ri) (if ri is unmatched in M then M(ri) is undefined) and the set
of residents assigned to hospital hj in M as M(hj). A hospital hj is under-subscribed in M if
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|M(hj)| < cj . An acceptable pair (ri, hj) can block a matching M or forms a blocking pair with
respect to M if ri is either unmatched or prefers hj to M(ri) and hj is either under-subscribed
or prefers ri to at least one resident in M(hj). A matching M is said to be stable if there exists
no blocking pair with respect to M .
We consider a generalisation of HR which occurs when the preference lists of the residents
and hospitals are allowed to contain ties, thus forming the Hospital/Residents Problem with
Ties (HRT). In an HRT instance a resident (hospital respectively) is indifferent between all
hospitals (residents respectively) in the same tie on its preference list. In this context various
definitions of stability exists. We consider weak stability [3] in which a pair (ri, hj) can block
a matching M if ri is either unmatched or strictly prefers hj to M(ri) and hj is either under-
subscribed or strictly prefers ri to at least one resident in M(hj). A matching M is said to be
weakly stable if there exists no blocking pairs with respect to M . Henceforth we will refer to a
weakly stable matching as simply a stable matching. Figure 1 shows a sample HRT instance.
Every instance of the HRT problem admits at least one weakly stable matching. This
can be obtained by breaking the ties in both sets of preference lists in an arbitrary manner,
thus giving rise to a HR instance which can then be solved using the Gale-Shapley algo-
rithm for HR [1]. The resulting stable matching is then stable in the original HR instance.
However, in general, the order in which the ties are broken yields stable matchings of vary-
ing sizes [9] and the problem of finding a maximum weakly stable matching given an HRT
instance (MAX HRT) is known to be NP-hard [9]. For example, the instance in Figure 1
admits the following stable matchings: M0 = {(r1, h1), (r2, h1), (r3, h3), (r5, h2), (r6, h2)} and
M1 = {(r1, h1), (r2, h1), (r3, h3), (r4, h2), (r5, h3), (r6, h2)} of sizes 5 and 6 respectively. Various
approximation algorithms for MAX HRT can be found in the literature [11, 7] with the best
current algorithm achieving a performance guarantee of 3/2.
Due to the NP-hardness of MAX HRT and the need to maximize the cardinality of stable
matchings in practical applications, Integer Programming (IP) can be used to solve MAX HRT
instances to optimality. This paper presents a new IP model for MAX HRT (Section 3). In
Section 4 we provide some details on the implementation of the model. Section 5 summarises
some of the results obtained by evaluating the model against real-world and randomly generated
problem instances. Finally Section 6 highlights some interesting open problems.
residents’ preferences hospitals’ capacities and preferences
r1 : h1 h2 h1 : (2) : r1 r2 r3 r6
r2 : h1 h2 : (2) : r2 r1 r6 (r4 r5)
r3 : h1 h3 h3 : (2) : r5 r3
r4 : h2
r5 : h2 h3
r6 : h1 h2
Figure 1: HRT instance I (entries in round brackets are tied)
2 Previous linear, integer and constraint programming models
Various Linear Programming (LP) formulations for stable matching problems appear in the
literature. The notable LP formulations for the one-to-one variant of HR, the Stable Marriage
problem (SM) (the restriction of HR in which n1 = n2 and cj = 1 for all hj ∈ H and every
resident finds every hospital acceptable), are presented by Gusfield and Irving [2] and Vande
Vate [16]. Extensions of the Vande Vate SM model to the Stable Marriage problem with
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Incomplete lists (SMI) (the restriction of HR in which cj = 1 for all hj ∈ H) and HR problems
were given by Rothblum [13]. LP formulations for SM have also been extended to the case
where we seek an egalitarian, minimum regret or minimum weight stable matchings [2, 16, 14].
Matching problems have also been modelled as constraint satisfaction problems. A constraint
programming approach to HR was presented in [10] and an extension to HRT presented in [15].
A review of CSP and LP approaches to stable matching problems can be found in [8].
IP formulations add the restriction that the variables involved must all have integral values
in any feasible solution. Although in general, the integer programming problem is NP-complete
[5], a wide variety of practical problems can be formulated and solved using integer program-
ming. An IP formulation for MAX SMTI was presented by Podhradsky` [12] where he compared
the sizes of weakly stable matchings obtained by running various approximation algorithms on
SMTI instances against the maximum weakly stable matchings obtained from his IP formula-
tion. In this paper we extend Podhradsky`’s IP model to the HRT case.
3 An IP model for MAX HRT
In this section we describe an IP model for MAX HRT. Let I be an instance of HRT consisting
of a set R = {r1, r2, ..., rn1} of residents and H = {h1, h2, ..., hn2} of hospitals. We denote the
binary variable xi,j (1 ≤ i ≤ n1, 1 ≤ j ≤ n2) to represent an acceptable pair in I formed by
resident ri and hospital hj . Variable xi,j will indicate whether ri is matched to hj in a solution or
not: if xi,j = 1 in a given solution J then ri is matched to hj in M (the matching obtained from
J), else ri is not matched to hj in M . We define rank(ri, hj), the rank of hj on ri’s preference
list to be k + 1 where k is the number of hospitals that ri strictly prefers to hj . An analogous
definition for rank(hj , ri) holds. Obviously for HRT instances agents in the same tie have the
same rank. We define rank(ri, hj) = rank(hj , ri) =∞ for an unacceptable pair (ri, hj). With
respect to a pair (ri, hj), we define the set Ti,j = {rp ∈ R : rank(hj , rp) ≤ rank(hj , ri)} and
Si,j = {hq ∈ H : rank(ri, hq) ≤ rank(ri, hj)}. We also define the set P (ri) to be the set of
hospitals that ri finds acceptable and P (hj) to be the set of residents that hj finds acceptable.
Figure 2 shows the resulting model. Constraint 1 ensures that each resident is matched to at
most one hospital and Constraint 2 ensures that each hospital does not exceed its capacity.
Finally Constraint 3 ensures that the matching is stable by ruling out the existence of any
blocking pair.
max
n1∑
i=1
∑
hj∈P (ri)
xi,j
subject to
1.
∑
hj∈P (ri)
xi,j ≤ 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n1)
2.
∑
ri∈P (hj)
xi,j ≤ cj (1 ≤ j ≤ n2)
3. cj
1− ∑
hq∈Si,j
xi,q
− ∑
rp∈Ti,j
xp,j ≤ 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ n1, hj ∈ P (ri))
xi,j ∈ {0, 1}
Figure 2: model1: A HRT IP model
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Theorem 3.1 Given a HRT instance I modeled as an IP using model1, a feasible solution
to model1 produces a weakly stable matching in I. Conversely a weakly stable matching in I
corresponds to a feasible solution to model1.
Proof Assume that the IP model has a feasible solution involving variables xi,j for each i (1 ≤
i ≤ n1), hj ∈ P (ri). Let M = {(ri, hj) ∈ R × H : ri ∈ R ∧ hj ∈ P (ri) ∧ xi,j = 1} be the
set of pairs in I generated from the IP solution. By constraints 1 and 2, M is a matching:
each resident is matched to at most one hospital, residents are only ever assigned to acceptable
hospitals, and hospitals do not exceed their capacities. Constraint 3 ensures that the matching
is weakly stable: if M was not a weakly stable matching then some pair (ri, hj) would block
M . Thus ri prefers hj to M(ri) or ri is unmatched. In both cases,
∑
hq∈Si,j xi,q = 0, meaning
the first term in constraint 3 would yield a value of cj . Also hj is either under-subscribed or hj
strictly prefers ri to one of the residents in M(hj). In both cases, the second term of constraint
3 would be less than cj thus the IP solution would be infeasible, a contradiction.
Conversely, assume that M is a weakly stable matching in I. We can show that M produces
a feasible solution to model1. Initially for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1), j (such that hj ∈ P (ri)), let
xi,j = 0. If (ri, hj) ∈M then set xi,j = 1. Constraints 1 and 2 are satisfied as M is a matching.
For constraint 3 not to be satisfied the first term of the left-hand-side must be greater than
the second. Thus for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and j (hj ∈ P (ri)), ri is either unmatched or strictly
prefers hj to M(ri), thus making the first term result in a value of cj as the first term can only
have a value of 0 or cj . The second term of the left-hand-side must then be less than cj . This
means that the number of residents rp assigned to hj , such that hj either prefers rp to ri or is
indifferent between them, is less than cj . Thus (ri, hj) would block M , a contradiction.
4 Implementing the model
In this section we describe some techniques used to reduce the size of the HRT model generated
and improve the performance of the IP solver. We also specify how the implementation was
tested for correctness.
4.1 Reducing the model size
Techniques were described in [4] for removing acceptable pairs that cannot be part of any
stable matching from HRT instances with ties on one side of the preference lists only. The
hospitals-offer and residents-apply algorithms described therein identify pairs that cannot be
involved in any stable matching, nor form a blocking pair with respect to any stable matching,
and remove them from the instance. This produces a reduced HRT instance that would yield
fewer variables and constraints when modelled as an IP, thus speeding up the optimisation
process. The original instance and the reduced instance have the same set of stable matchings.
These techniques are only applicable to instances where ties exists on one side only. This is a
natural restriction that can be found in practice where hospitals usually rank residents based
on performance grades (which can easily be tied) with residents being required to provide a
strict preference of a bounded length (say 5 hospitals).
To help explain the hospitals-offer and residents-offer procedures, we will define some use-
ful terms. We begin with the hospitals-offer procedure shown in Algorithm 1. The process
involves hospitals offering positions to residents, who form provisional arrangements with the
hospitals. We define an active tie Tj on a hospital hj ’s preference list, as a tie containing one
or more residents that immediately follows the least preferred resident currently assigned to
hj . Quantity tj = |Tj | may be 0 if such a tie does not exist. Also the value of tj may change
during the execution of the hospitals-offer algorithm due to potential deletions of pairs from
the problem instance. We denote the number of vacancies vj in hj as the difference between the
capacity cj and the number of residents currently assigned to it. Hospital hj is full when vj = 0
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and undersubscribed when vj > 0. For each hospital that hasa number of vacancies greater or
equal to the size of the current active tie, the residents in the active tie are assigned to that
hospital. If these residents were previously matched to other hospitals, those assignments are
broken. For each of these residents ri ∈ Tj , this is followed by the removal, from ri’s preference
list, of all the hospitals that are successors to hj . The process terminates when each hospital
has an active tie of length 0, or its number of vacancies is less than the size of its active tie.
Algorithm 1 Hospitals-offer
1: while (there is a hospital hj such that vj ≥ tj > 0) do
2: for (each resident ri in tj) do
3: if (ri is already assigned, say to hk) then
4: unassign ri;
5: increment vk;
6: end if
7: assign ri to hj ;
8: decrement vj ;
9: for (each hospital hk that is a strict successor of hj on ri’s list) do
10: delete the pair (ri, hk) from the preference lists;
11: end for
12: end for
13: end while
Algorithm 2 Residents-apply
1: while (some resident ri is free and has a nonempty list) do
2: hj = first hospital on ri’s list;
3: assign ri to hj ;
4: increment aj ;
5: if (aj ≥ cj) then
6: let rk be one of hj ’s c
th-choice assignees where c = cj ;
7: for (each strict successor rl of rk in hj ’s list) do
8: if (rl is assigned to hj) then
9: break the assignment;
10: decrement aj ;
11: end if
12: delete pair (rl, hj);
13: end for
14: end if
15: end while
The residents-apply procedure shown in Algorithm 2, involves residents successfully apply-
ing to hospitals on their preference list in preference order, again forming provisional assignment
with the hospitals. We define aj to be the the number of assignees of a hospital hj . Each unas-
signed resident (say ri) applies to the first hospital on his/her preference list (say hj). Resident
ri is then temporarily assigned to hj and aj is incremented. This assignment may make hj full
(aj = cj) or oversubscribed (aj > cj). In both cases, all strict successors of hj ’s c
th
j assignee are
then removed from its preference list and it from theirs. This deletion may make some resident
rk previously assigned to hj to be free again (if this happens aj is decremented). That resident
can then apply to the next hospital on his/her preference list. The process will continue while
some resident is free and has a hospital on his/her preference list.
Other steps were taken to improve the optimisation performance of the models. These
include placing a lower bound on the objective function and providing an initial solution to the
CPLEX solver. Both can be obtained by executing any of the approximation algorithms [4] on
the HRT instance (the 3/2-approximation algorithm for HRT with ties on one side only due to
Kira´ly [6] was chosen).
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4.2 Testing the implementation
Although the theoretical model has been proven to be correct, it is still important to verify the
correctness of the implementation. The system was tested to ensure a high degree of confidence
in the results obtained. The correctness of the pre-processing steps and the IP solution were
evaluated by generating multiple instances (100,000) of various sizes (with up to 400 residents)
and testing the stability and size of the resulting matching against both the original and the
trimmed problem instance. The matchings generated can also be tested to ensure that the
hospitals do not exceed their capacities, residents are assigned to at most one hospital, and
assignments are consistent (meaning that if ri is assigned to hj then hj is also assigned to ri).
For all the instances tested, the solver produced stable matchings.
Stability is just one property of the resulting matching that needs to be tested. Another
important property is optimality. One method of testing the optimality of the stable matchings
produced would be to compare the sizes of optimal solutions generated by various models on the
same problem instance. Although we have presented only one IP model, HRT can be modeled
as integer programs in various ways. Implementing these different models and comparing their
outputs gives some indication of the correctness of the implementation. This test is not fool-
proof as errors in the implementations may be duplicated in the models. We would have to
test for optimality using a more exhaustive approach.
To verify that the stable matchings generated by the IP model are optimal, another method
is to generate all stable matchings in the HRT model. The largest stable matching found would
then be compared to the optimal solution obtained by the solver. If the sizes of both matchings
are the same, we confirm that the IP solver produced an optimal solution to that instance. A
difference would indicate a fault in one or both of the methods. The larger the number of
instances tested and the bigger the size of instances, the more confident we will be of the IP
implementation. The generation of all stable matchings was done by finding all matchings in
the underlying bipartite graph, testing for stability of each matching and keeping a record of
the largest found. Due to the brute-force nature of this technique we could only generate and
test 100 instances each of size 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 to optimality. For all the instances tested,
the solver produced optimal stable matchings.
5 Empirical evaluation
An empirical evaluation of the IP model was carried out. Large numbers of random instances of
HRT were generated by varying certain parameters relating to the construction of the instance
and passed on to the CPLEX IP solver. Data from past SFAS matching runs were also modelled
and solved. This section discusses the methodology used and some of the results obtained.
Experiments were carried out on a Linux machine with 8 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPUs at 2.5GHz
and 32GB RAM.
td n1 = 200 n1 = 250 n1 = 300
75% 100.00% 100.00% 99.85%
80% 99.98% 99.88% 99.39%
85% 99.90% 99.29% 97.76%
90% 99.70% 99.28% 98.60%
95% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1: Percentage solvable instances (100% for omitted td values)
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5.1 Using random instances
Random HRT problem instances were generated. The instances consist of n1 residents, n2
hospitals and C posts where n1, n2 and C can be varied. The hospital posts were randomly
distributed amongst the hospitals. Other properties of the generated instance that can be
varied include the lengths of residents’ preference lists as well as a measure of the density td of
ties present in the preference lists. The tie density td (0 ≤ td ≤ 1) of the preference lists is the
probability that some agent is tied to the agent next to it in a given preference list. At td = 1
each preference lists would be contained a single tie while at td = 0 no tie would exist in the
preference lists of all agents thus reducing the problem to an HR instance. We define the size
of the instance as the number of residents n1 present.
5.1.1 Varying tie density
Since ties cause the size of stable matchings to vary, an obvious question to investigate is how
the variation in tie density affects the runtime of the IP model and the size of the maximum
stable matchings found. These values were measured for multiple instances of MAX HRT while
varying the tie density td of hospitals’ preference lists. There were no ties in the residents’
preference lists. This was done for increasing sizes (n1 = 200, 250, 300) of the problem instance
with the residents’ preference lists being kept strictly ordered at 5 hospitals each. A total
of 10000 instances were randomly generated for each tie density value (starting at td = 0%
to td = 100% with an interval of 5%) and instance size. For each instance C = n1 and
n2 = b0.07× nRc.
To avoid extreme outliers skewing the mean measures, we define what we regard as a
reasonable solution time (300 seconds) and abandon search if the solver exceeds this cut-off
time. For most tie densities this cut-off was not exceeded for the values of n1 and td considered
(omitted td values were 100% solvable). Table 1 shows the percentage of instances that were
solved before the cut-off was exceeded.
From Figures 3 and 4 we see that the mean and median runtime remain significantly low
for instances with td < 60% but then gradually increase until they reach their peaks (in the
region of 80% − 90%) before falling as the tie density approaches 100%. From a theoretical
perspective, it is known that the problem is polynomially solvable when the tie density is at
both 0% and 100% and it is easy to see how the IP solver will find these cases trivial. As the
tie density increases the number of stable matchings that the instance is likely to admit also
increases, explaining the observed increase in the runtime. The hospitals-offer and residents-
apply algorithms used to trim the instance also play their part in this trend with limited
trimming done for higher tie densities.
Figure 5 shows the variation in optimal values with tie density for n1 = 300. We observe
an increase in the average size of maximum stable matchings as the tie density increases. This
is in line with the idea that the stability requirement restricts the size of stable matchings and
increasing tie density can be viewed as relaxing stability requirements.
5.1.2 Increasing instance size
The execution time for solving multiple MAX HRT IP model instances of increasing sizes was
evaluated. The tie density td and preference list lengths were kept constant. This provided an
estimate of problem sizes for which the IP model can be of practical value. The tie densities of
the hospitals’ preference lists were set to 0.85 on all instances. On the bases of the results from
the previous section, we estimate that instances with tie density in this region (0.7–0.95) will
take longer to be solved than others. There were no ties on the residents’ preference lists. The
instance size n1 was increased by 50 starting at n1 = 100. A total of 100 instances for each
instance size was generated. The number of hospitals n2 in each instance was set to b0.07×n1c.
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Figure 3: Mean runtime vs td Figure 4: Median runtime vs td
Figure 5: |M | vs td for n1 = 300
Each resident has a preference list of 5 hospitals with each hospitals’ preference list length being
determined by the frequency of its occurrence within the residents’ lists.
Table 6 shows how the mean and median runtime rise as n1 increases. We assume the sharp
difference between the mean and median is due to the presence of outliers corresponding to
exceptionally difficult instances. As the instance size grows the existence of challenging outliers
becomes more probable, leading to a more rapid increase in the mean runtime compared to the
median runtime. Table 7 shows the difference between the mean and min optimal solutions
found. It is interesting to observe that optimal solutions tend to match almost every resident
given the instance generation parameters used.
5.2 Using real instances
Another question worth asking is whether the IP model can handle instance sizes found in real-
world applications. In [4], various approximation algorithms and heuristics were implemented
and tested on real datasets from the SFAS matching scheme for 2006, 2007 and 2008 where the
residents’ preferences are strictly ordered with ties existing in the hospitals’ preference lists.
With the IP model, it is now possible to trim the instances using the techniques mentioned in
Section 3, generate an optimal solution and compare the results obtained with those reported
in [4]. Results from these tests showed that, while some algorithms did marginally better than
8
Figure 6: Mean and median runtime vs in-
stance size
Figure 7: Optimal solution size vs instance
size
others, all the algorithms developed generated relatively large stable matchings with respect to
the optimal values. Table 2 shows this comparison. Let M ′ denote the largest stable matching
found over all the algorithms tested in [4].
year n1 n2 td time (sec) |M | |M ′| from [4]
2006 759 53 92% 92.96 758 754
2007 781 53 76% 21.78 746 744
2008 748 52 81% 75.50 709 705
Table 2: SFAS IP Results
6 Future work
It still remains to be tested whether various node, variable and value ordering heuristics would
help improve the performance of the IP model. Another interesting idea is to investigate the
possibility of adopting a column generation technique for the IP model in order to improve
scalability so that larger instance sizes can be solved.
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